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I. INTRODUCTION
THE NATIONAL Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) ex-
cludes lawyers from the investigation process. Through an
independent investigation, the NTSB uncovers facts related to
the accident, determines probable cause, and makes safety rec-
ommendations. The practitioner must have more than a gen-
eral understanding of the NTSB investigation process to
effectively manage an aviation crash case and to properly advise
the client. The typical defendant/client-for example, the air
carrier, the manufacturer, or the maintenance provider-must
be advised about being responsive to, and cooperative with, the
NTSB, and must understand the importance of maintaining sep-
aration between litigation activities and accident investigation.
From the plaintiff/victim perspective, counsel must advise about
the perceived limitations in the process, the inability to actively
participate or influence the course, scope, or outcome of the
investigation, and the implications on the cost of developing the
case through independent investigations.
This paper discusses the NTSB investigation process and ex-
plains the use of NTSB investigatory materials, reports, and testi-
mony in subsequent civil litigation. Counsel from both sides
must be familiar with the rules regarding the admissibility of re-
ports, the regulations related to obtaining evidence from the in-
vestigation, as well as those related to protecting proprietary




The origins of the federal government's official involvement
in civil air accident investigations and air safety can be traced to
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the Air Commerce Act of 1926.' The Air Commerce Act gave
the Secretary of Air Commerce the duty "to investigate, record,
and make public the causes of accidents in civil air navigation in
the United States."' 2 By 1934, Congress specified that the Secre-
tary's powers included the authority to hold hearings, conduct
official investigations, subpoena witnesses, and compel coopera-
tion. In 1937, the first true accident panel was formed with the
same basic structure that the NTSB has today.4 In 1938, Con-
gress created the Civil Aeronautics Authority and the Air Safety
Board.5 In 1940, the investigatory powers were transferred to
the new Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). 6 The CAB came under
the newly created Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in
1958. 7 Then, in 1966, the CAB became the NTSB under the
Department of Transportation Act.8 The NTSB "opened its
doors on April 1, 1967."'
The NTSB was technically independent, although there ex-
isted the possibility of influence because of the Board's reliance
on the U.S. Department of Transportation for funding and ad-
ministrative support.1 ° To enhance the perception of true inde-
pendence, Congress passed the Independent Safety Board Act
of 1974.11 This Act removed the NTSB from the control of the
Department of Transportation and gave it structural auton-
Trowbridge Littleton, The National Transportation Safety Board: How Should
They Conduct Witness Investigations-The Need for a Privilege, 27 TRANsP. LJ. 255,
257 (2000) (citing Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 568 (1926)); John D.
Clemen & Stephen R. Long, Representing Potential Litigants as Parties to NTSB Public
Hearings: Some Problems in Search of Solutions, 56 J. AIR L. & CoM. 969, 972-73
(1991).
2 Littleton, supra note 1, at 257 (citing Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 569
(1926)).
3 Id.
4 Id. The panel had five members. Three members were from the Depart-
ment of Commerce and two were chosen for their expertise. Id.
5 Clemen & Long, supra note 1, at 973 (citing Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,
Pub. L. No. 706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938)).
6 Littleton, supra note 1, at 257; Clemen & Long, supra note 1, at 973.
7 Littleton, supra note 1, at 257 (citing Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L.
No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958)); Clemen & Long, supra note 1, at 973.
8 Littleton, supra note 1, at 258 (citing Department of Transportation Act, Pub.
L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931, 935 (1966)); Clemen & Long, supra note 1, at 974.
9 National Transportation Safety Board, About the NTSB: History and Mission,
at http://www.ntsb.gov/AbtNTSB/history.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2003) [here-
inafter NTSB History].
10 Clemen & Long, supra note 1, at 974; NTSB History, supra note 9.
1l Littleton, supra note 1, at 258; Clemen & Long, supra note 1, at 975; NTSB
History, supra note 9.
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omy. 2 The NTSB has largely retained this organizational struc-
ture since 1974.13
B. OVERVIEW OF THE INVESTIGATION PROCESS
The stated purpose of an NTSB investigation is to "determine
facts, conditions, and circumstances relating to an accident or
incident and the probable cause(s) thereof.'1 4 The Board does
not adjudicate civil claims. 5 Investigations "are not conducted
for the purpose of determining the rights or liabilities of any
person," and the Board does not attempt to allocate responsibil-
ity to various parties as may happen in a civil lawsuit.16 In con-
trast to civil lawsuits, the Board is allowed to consider evidence
that might otherwise be excluded under traditional rules of
evidence. 17
In the context of a large commercial aircraft loss, the central
component of an NTSB investigation is the "Go Team."'" The
Go Team represents the NTSB's quick response capability; it al-
lows for the immediate, organized collection of facts after an
accident. The Go Team's purpose is to "[b]egin the investiga-
tion of a major accident at the accident scene, as quickly as pos-
sible, assembling the broad spectrum of technical expertise that
is needed to solve complex transportation safety problems."19
The chief of the Go Team is the Investigator in Charge (IIC),20
and he or she is dispatched from the agency's office in Washing-
ton, D.C.
2 1
Each of the NTSB investigators, working under the IIC, heads
up an investigative group or a "working group. ' 22 There can be
12 Littleton, supra note 1, at 258; Clemen & Long, supra note 1, at 975; NTSB
History, supra note 9.
13 Littleton, supra note 1, at 258.
14 National Transportation Safety Board Rule, 49 C.F.R. § 831.4 (2002).
15 Graham v. Teledyne-Continental Motors, 805 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir.
1986).
16 49 C.F.R. § 831.4; PhillipJ. Kolczynski, NTSB Investigation Guide, at http://
www.aviationlawcorp.com/content/ntsbinvest.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2003).
17 Kolczynski, supra note 16.
18 National Transportation Safety Board, About the NTSB: The Investigative
Process, at http://www.ntsb.gov/abt-ntsb/invest.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2003)
[hereinafter NTSB Investigative Process].
19 Id.
20 49 C.F.R. § 831.8 (2002).
21 Cynthia C. Lebow & Liam P. Sarsfield, Safety in the Skies 14 (RAND 1999);
NTSB Investigative Process, supra note 18.
22 Lebow & Sarsfield, supra note 21, at 14; NTSB Investigative Process, supra
note 18.
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as many as ten investigative groups.23 In an aviation investiga-
tion the specialties are typically: (1) Operations; (2) Structures;
(3) Power Plants; (4) Systems; (5) Air Traffic Control; (6)
Weather; (7) Human Performance; (8) Survival Factors; (9) Air-
craft Performance; (10) Maintenance Records; and (11) Eyewit-
ness groups formed at the scene.24 There are also Flight Data
Recorder and Cockpit Voice Recorder teams, which form at the
NTSB headquarters.25
To aid in the expertise of the investigation, and to lower the
operating costs of the NTSB, representatives of "parties" to the
investigation staff the above listed working groups.26 The NTSB
has discretion to determine party status: "The investigator-in-
charge designates parties to participate in the investigation. 27
Only those organizations or corporations that can provide the
Board with needed technical or specialized expertise are permit-
ted to serve on the investigation. 28 The NTSB website gives
some typical examples of parties: the FAA (which is the only en-
tity that has a right to "party" status), the air carrier, the pilots'
and flight attendants' unions, and the airframe and engine
manufacturer.2 9
Generally, an NTSB investigation takes priority over all other
investigations by federal agencies." The only exception to the
NTSB's priority is the circumstance where the Attorney General,
in consultation with the Chairman of the NTSB, determines that
the circumstances surrounding the incident reasonably indicate
that an intentional criminal act may be involved." If there is a
criminal investigation, the Board relinquishes its investigative
priority to the FBI. The Board does, however, retain authority
to continue its investigation.12 Other federal agencies may con-
duct investigations, but may only do so on a non-interference
basis. 3
23 Lebow & Sarsfield, supra note 21, at 14.
24 NTSB Investigative Process, supra note 18.
25 Id.
26 Lebow & Sarsfield, supra note 21, at 15; NTSB Investigative Process, supra
note 18; 49 C.F.R. § 831.11 (2002).
27 49 C.F.R. § 831.11(a)(1) (2002).
28 NTSB Investigative Process, supa note 18; see also 49 C.F.R. § 831.11.
29 NTSB Investigative Process, supra note 18.
30 49 C.F.R. § 831.5 (2002); 49 C.F.R. § 1131(a) (2) (A) (2002).
31 49 C.F.R. § 1131(a) (2)(B) (2002).
32 Id.
33 49 C.F.R. § 831.5.
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C. POWERS OF NTSB INVESTIGATORS
NTSB investigators have broad powers, which give them an
unfettered opportunity to develop the facts: "Any employee of
the Board, upon presenting appropriate credentials, is author-
ized to enter any property where an accident/incident subject
to the Board's jurisdiction has occurred, or wreckage from any
such accident/incident is located, and do all things considered nec-
essary for proper investigation."34 Investigators from the NTSB have
broad powers regarding evidence and objects related to the
investigation:
[U]pon demand of an authorized representative of the Board
and presentation of credentials, any Government agency, or per-
son having possession or control of any transportation vehicle or
component thereof, any facility, equipment, process or controls
relevant to the investigation, or any pertinent records or memo-
randa, including all files, hospital records, and correspondence
then and thereafter existing, and kept or required to be kept,
shall forthwith permit inspection, photographing, or copying
thereof. .. ."
Furthermore, the NTSB can issue subpoenas for testimony or
other evidence, which are enforceable in federal district
courts. 6 Board representatives "may question any person hav-
ing knowledge relevant to an accident/incident, study, or spe-
cial investigation.""7 Representatives of the Board also have
exclusive authority "to decide the way in which any testing will
be conducted, including decisions on the person that will con-
duct the test, the type of test that will be conducted, and any
individual who will witness the test.
3 8
An employee of the Board "is authorized to examine and
test... any civil or public aircraft ... aircraft engine, propeller,
appliance, or property aboard such aircraft involved in an acci-
dent. ' 39 The Board is authorized to receive, at no cost, a copy of
34 49 C.F.R. § 831.9(a) (2002) (emphasis added); see also 49 C.F.R.
§ 1134(a)(1) (2002) (stating that an officer or employee of the National Trans-
portation Safety Board, "on display of appropriate credentials and written notice
of inspection authority, may enter property where a transportation accident has
occurred or wreckage is located and do anything necessary to conduct an
investigation.").
35 49 C.F.R. § 831.9(a); 49 C.F.R. § 1134(a)(2) (2002).
36 49 C.F.R. § 831.9(a).
37 Id.
38 Id.; see also 49 C.F.R. § 1134(d) (2002).
39 49 C.F.R. § 831.9(b) (2002).
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any related autopsy reports performed by a state or local official
and may order an autopsy or other tests.4" The NTSB's accident
investigation personnel have exclusive access to wreckage,
records, mail, or cargo in its custody.4 When the Board has no
further use for these objects, it shall release them.4 2
The NTSB is given authority to sanction non-complying par-
ties or even bring civil suit in federal district court to enforce
certain rights.4 3 "Participants in the investigation .. .shall be
responsive to the direction of Board representatives and may
lose party status if they do not comply with their assigned du-
ties... or if they conduct themselves in a manner prejudicial to
the investigation. '4  Failure to timely sign the Statement of
Party Representation to NTSB Investigation, discussed below,
"may result in sanctions, including loss of status as a party. ' 45
The Board may bring a civil action in a district court of the
United States against a person "to enforce section 1132, 1134(b)
or (f)(1)(related to an aircraft accident), 1136(g)(2), or
1155(a) of this title or a regulation prescribed or order issued
under any of those sections. '46
III. THE RIGHTS AND LIMITATIONS OF PARTIES
A. PARTy STATUS
The IIC has limited discretion to appoint parties to its investi-
gation. No one has a right to be a party to an investigation,"
except the FAA in aviation cases," and the Secretary of Trans-
portation "when participation is necessary to carry out the duties
and powers of the secretary."4 The Secretary of Transportation
cannot play a role in establishing probable cause, 50 and addi-
tionally, the FAA is not permitted to use any information it ac-
quired in an NTSB investigation for FAA enforcement
- 49 C.F.R. § 831.10 (2002).
41 49 C.F.R. § 831.12(a) (2002).
42 49 C.F.R. § 831.12(b) (2002).
43 49 C.F.R. § 831.11(a) (3) (2002); 49 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2002).
- 49 C.F.R. § 831.11(a)(2).
45 Id.
46 49 U.S.C. § 1151(a).
47 Trump Taj Mahal Assoc. v. NTSB, No. 89-7529, 1989 WL 130216, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 31, 1989); Graham v. Teledyne-Continental Motors, 805 F.2d 1386, 1389
(9th Cir. 1986); NTSB Investigative Process, supra note 18.
4 49 C.F.R. § 831.11(a)(1).
49 49 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (1996).
50 Id.
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purposes.5 1 The only entities or persons that may be parties to
an NTSB investigation are those who were "involved in the acci-
dent or incident and who can provide suitable qualified techni-
cal personnel actively to assist in the investigation.
52
Accordingly, a victim or deceased passenger's representative will
not likely be given party status.
In Graham v. Teledyne-Continental Motors, the Ninth Circuit
held that the NTSB did not abuse its discretion by denying party
status to the estate representative of a pilot that died in a plane
crash.5" The "use of the [engine manufacturer's] facilities and
expertise in disassembling its own engines could be indispensa-
ble in enabling the NTSB to carry out its mission. By contrast,
there is nothing unique [that the deceased pilot's] expert could
add to the investigation. '54 Similarly, a court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied party status to the employer of a vic-
tim. 55 On the other hand, a trial court did abuse its discretion
when it refused to allow the representative of an aircraft owner
to observe the inspection and disassembly of the engine, even
though the regulations did not grant the owner any right to
participation.56
There can be no party appointment out of good will or sympa-
thy. NTSB investigations function to rationally collect facts with-
out any deference to sympathies or outside influence. The
Board's investigation is removed from, and unaffected by, prep-
arations for civil litigation. Therefore, the victim's representa-
tives or families have no right to party status. As one court
bluntly put it: "The only one connected to the [deceased pilot]
who might have had unique insight into what happened was
James Graham, the pilot, who is dead. '57 As a consequence,
51 Kolczynski, supra note 16, at 1.
52 49 C.F.R. § 831.11(a)(1) (emphasis added).
53 Graham, 805 F.2d at 1389.
54 Id.
55 Trump Taj Mahal Assoc. v. NTSB, No. 89-7529, 1989 WL 130216, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 31, 1989).
56 Miller v. Rich, 845 F.2d 190, 192-93 (9th Cir. 1988). A crash occurred
shortly after takeoff in Van Nuys, California. The owner of the aircraft sought to
enjoin inspection and disassembly of the engine until his representative was au-
thorized to observe the process. The Ninth Circuit held that the NTSB had dis-
cretion, but that it was not "unbridled." Id. Since the NTSB did not prove any
rational justification for the exclusion, the court held that the actions constituted
an abuse of discretion and reversed the district court's denial of the owner's in-
junction. Id.




while air carriers and manufacturers are often granted party sta-
tus in a major air disaster, the victims and the victims' represent-
atives will typically not be designated as parties.
To avoid the perception of unfairness in the system, the NTSB
places limitations on the party members to try to insulate them
from litigation preparations. Party representatives must be em-
ployees of the party.58 No party to the investigation can be a
lawyer, a lawyer's representative, or a representative of an insur-
ance company.59 "Parties shall be represented by suitable quali-
fied technical employees or members who do not occupy legal
positions."6 ° Party representatives may not relay information
back to corporate headquarters, or anyone in the public, except
for purposes of accident prevention or remedial action, and not
without the consent of the IIC:
All information concerning the accident or incident obtained by
any person or organization participating in the investigation shall
be passed to the IIC through appropriate channels before being
provided to any individual outside the investigation. Parties to
the investigation may relay to their respective organizations infor-
mation necessary for purposes of prevention or remedial action.
However no information concerning the accident or incident
may be released to any person not a party representative to the
investigation (including non-party representative employees of
the party organization) before initial release by the Safety Board
without prior consultation and approval of the IIC. 1
B. SIGNED STATEMENT OF PARTY REPRESENTATIVES
Furthermore, party representatives must sign an oath called a
"Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation,"
which requires that the party and representative abide by NTSB
rules.62 The oath discusses the parties' duties and includes lan-
58 49 C.F.R. § 845.13(a) (2002); Lebow & Sarsfield, supra note 21, at 15.
59 49 C.F.R. § 831.11(a) (3); 49 C.F.R. § 845.13(a).
6 49 C.F.R. § 845.13(a).
61 49 C.F.R. § 831.13(b) (2002).
62 49 C.F.R. § 831.11(b) (2002). The full text of a statement that parties
signed to join one investigation was:
It is understood that a party representative to an investigation may
not be a person who also represents claimants or insurers. The
placement of a signature hereon constitutes a representation that
participation in this investigation is not on behalf of either claim-
ants or insurers and that, while any information obtained may ulti-
mately be used in litigation, participation is not for the purposes of
litigation.
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guage that the parties are waiving their right to assert a privilege
in litigation with respect to information or documents obtained
during NTSB investigations. 6' Thestatement reads in part: "By
placing their signatures hereon all participants agree that they
will neither assert nor permit to be asserted on their behalf, any
privilege in litigation, with respect to information or documents
obtained during the course of and as a result of participation in
the NTSB investigation. '64 This waiver is an evidentiary or dis-
covery waiver through which the parties give up potential discov-
ery privileges in future litigation.65 The Fifth Circuit held that
the waiver does not include substantive immunities like the im-
munity from tort liability under Texas law for statements made
during judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. 66 Anyone acting
counter to these rules can be sanctioned or lose party status, or
both.67 The parties may in advance, however, identify docu-
ments that should be protected as proprietary or trade secret
information.6"
IV. THE PUBLIC HEARINGS
The NTSB may conduct hearings as a part of its accident in-
vestigation. The stated purpose of a hearing is to "assist the
Board in determining cause or probable cause of an accident, in
reporting the facts, conditions, and circumstances of the acci-
dent, and in ascertaining measures which will tend to prevent
By placing their signatures hereon all participants agree that they
will neither assert nor permit to be asserted on their behalf, any
privilege in litigation, with respect to information or documents ob-
tained during the course of and as a result of participation in the
NTSB investigation as described above. It is understood, however,
that this form is not intended to prevent the undersigned from par-
ticipating in litigation arising out of the accident referred to above
or to require disclosure of the undersigned's communication with
counsel.
Thomas Brooks Chartered v. Burnett, 920 F.2d 634, 637 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990)
(quoting Party Statement).
63 Chiron Corp. v. NTSB, 198 F.3d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Shanks v. Allied-
Signal, Inc., 169 F.3d 988, 996 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 843 (2002).
64 Shanks, 169 F.3d at 996.
65 Id. (citing Thomas Brooks, 920 F.2d at 647).
66 Id.
67 Id.; 49 C.F.R. § 831.11(a)(2)-(3); 49 C.F.R. § 845.13(b).
68 See generally Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2001); 49 U.S.C. § 1114(b)
(1996) (limiting circumstances in which NTSB can disclose proprietary informa-
tion); Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2001); 49 C.F.R.




accidents and promote transportation safety."'69 The hearings
are further described as "fact finding proceedings with no for-
mal issues and no adverse parties. "70 The hearings are public
unless they are determined to be classified or in situations where
national security related evidence is received. 71 A stenographic
transcript of the hearings is taken, 72 and a board of inquiry is
established, which contains a member of the NTSB who is ap-
pointed by the NTSB and who acts as the chairman. 73 The
chairman of the board of inquiry designates parties to the hear-
ing, which are persons or entities whose "participation in the
hearing is deemed necessary in the public interest and whose
special knowledge will contribute to the development of perti-
nent evidence. 71 4 These parties often include "the Federal Avia-
tion Administration, operator, airframe manufacturer, engine
manufacturer, pilots union, and any other organization that can
assist the Safety Board in completing its record of the investiga-
tion. ' ' 75 There is no right to party status by anyone except the
FAA.76 The parties should appoint a single spokesperson for the
hearing. 77 The NTSB website states, "News media, family mem-
bers, lawyers, and insurance personnel are not parties to the in-
vestigation and are not permitted to participate in the public
hearings."78
Employees that do not occupy legal positions or represent
claimants or insurers can represent parties to the hearing.
79
The chairman has judge-like powers to determine the admissi-
bility of evidence and to regulate the course of the hearing.
80
Any person that testifies at the hearing has the right to be repre-
sented by counsel and the right to be paid travel and attendance
fees if subpoenaed .8 The board of inquiry first examines a wit-
ness and then parties to the hearing may examine the witness-8
2
69 49 C.F.R. § 845.2 (2002).
70 Id.
71 49 C.F.R. § 845.3 (2002).
72 49 C.F.R. § 845.28 (2002).
73 49 C.F.R. § 845.11 (2002).
74 49 C.F.R. § 845.13(a).
75 National Transportation Safety Board, About the NTSB: Public Hearings, at




79 49 C.F.R. § 845.13(b).
80 49 C.F.R. § 845.13(c).
A' 49 C.F.R. §§ 845.24, 845.29 (2002).
82 49 C.F.R. § 845.25(a) (2002).
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A public hearing is not a mandatory part of the investigation.
Consequently, except in very large commercial air disasters, the
NTSB may not hold a public hearing. If a hearing is held, coun-
sel for parties must familiarize themselves and their clients with
the procedural rules related to the public hearing and the po-
tential impact on subsequent or ongoing litigation.
V. THE "SUNSHINE MEETING" AND THE FINAL REPORT
The investigation concludes with the issuance of a final re-
port. 3 "The report will set forth the facts, conditions and cir-
cumstances relating to the accident and the probable cause
thereof, along with any appropriate recommendations formu-
lated."84 Before issuance of the final report, however, each
NTSB group chair completes a factual report that is placed in
the public docket.85 The Board staff prepares a draft final re-
port without the participation of the parties.86 Parties may sub-
mit proposed findings of cause and safety recommendations to
the Board for inclusion in the final report.87 The Board is not
required to follow the proposed findings of the parties, but the
proposals become part of the public record. 8
The Board then conducts a public meeting in Washington,
D.C. called the "Sunshine Meeting," where the Board deliber-
ates over the report.89 Non-NTSB personnel, such as parties, are
not permitted to interact with the Board at the Sunshine Meet-
ing.9" The Board may vote to adopt the draft of the final report
at this meeting, 9' or may instead require further investigation or
revision, or adopt the report with changes discussed at the meet-
ing.92 In the end, two reports are issued: a factual accident re-
port, which should consist of only factual findings, and a Board
83 49 C.F.R. § 845.40 (2002).
84 49 C.F.R. § 845.40(a).
8-5 Lebow & Sarsfield, supra note 21, at 15; see discussion infra Part IV.
86 NTSB Investigative Process, supra note 18; Lebow & Sarsfield, supra note 21,
at 15.
87 49 C.F.R. § 831.14(a) (2002); NTSB Investigative Process, supra note 18.
88 49 C.F.R. § 831.14; 49 C.F.R. § 845.50 (2002); NTSB Investigative Process,
supra note 18.
89 NTSB Investigative Process, supra note 18; Lebow & Sarsfield, supra note 21,
at 16.
90 NTSB Investigative Process, supra note 18.
91 Id.; Lebow & Sarsfield, supra note 21, at 16.
92 Lebow & Sarsfield, supra note 21, at 16.
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accident or "blue cover" report, which contains the probable
cause determinations and recommendations, if any.93
VI. REVIEW OR MODIFICATION OF NTSB REPORTS
Investigations are never officially closed; new and pertinent
evidence may be submitted by any interested person.9" Parties
or persons with a direct interest in the accident investigation
may petition the Board to reconsider and modify findings and
probable cause determinations in light of error or new evi-
dence.95 Although the regulations provide that persons with a
direct interest may petition the board, a recent RAND study of
the NTSB stated flatly that in reality "[p]etitions from non-par-
ties will not be considered."96 NTSB decisions are not, however,
subject to review under the Administrative Procedure Act.97
Courts, depending on the jurisdiction, review decisions by the
NTSB under an abuse of discretion standard or the more expan-
sive standard of "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law."
9 8
In short, it is unlikely that an NTSB report can be revised
once published. For that reason, the parties must carefully and
effectively draft proposed findings and safety recommendations
well in advance of the release of the final report.
VII. NTSB REPORTS AND INVESTIGATORY MATERIALS
IN CIVIL TRIALS
Both practitioners and courts recognize that NTSB reports
contain valuable evidence. However, as an investigatory body,
the NTSB cannot be the final arbiter of civil liability. Legislative
and regulatory roadblocks protect the integrity of the investiga-
tion process and preserve the autonomy of the trier of fact in
related civil litigation. Courts have struggled with the question
of admitting only the factual portions of NTSB reports and seg-
regating the probable cause or opinions.
93 49 C.F.R. § 835.4 (2002); Kolczynski, supra note 16.
94 49 C.F.R. § 845.51 (2002).
95 49 C.F.R. § 845.41 (2002).
96 Id.; Lebow & Sarsfield, supra note 21, at 16.
97 National Transportation Safety Board Rule, 49 C.F.R. § 831.4 (2002).
98 Thomas Brooks Chartered v. Burnett, 920 F.2d 634, 643 (10th Cir. 1990);
Graham v. Teledyne-Continental Motors, 805 F.2d 1386, 1387-88 (9th Cir. 1986).
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A. PRESERVING THE TRIER OF FACT'S ROLE
Federal and state law have long sought to preserve the role of
the trier of fact, particularly in the context of admitting NTSB
reports. Notwithstanding, and in the face of legislation and reg-
ulation prohibiting the admissibility of any part of an NTSB re-
port, U.S. courts have found ways to admit all or part of NTSB
reports.99
Courts have been little constrained by what appears to be
clear legislation prohibiting the admissibility of such reports.
Section 701 (e) of the Federal Aviation Act (and 701 (e) of the
Civil Aeronautics Act) prohibited the use of investigation re-
ports in civil trials.1"' The statute is recodified and can now be
found at 49 U.S.C. § 1154 (the "exclusionary rule"), °  which
provides: "No part of a report of the Board, related to an acci-
dent or an investigation of an accident, may be admitted into
evidence or used in a civil action for damages resulting from a
matter mentioned in the report.' 0 2 This language unequivo-
cally applies on its face, to any "part of a report of the Board. '10 3
Courts have not, however, uniformly interpreted this language.
The result is three distinct applications of the rule: the majority
view, the minority view, and a new view based on the Chiron
opinion and a 1999 modification to the NTSB regulations.
Prior to 1975, the NTSB rules did not make a clear distinction
between the purely factual report, and the final report on prob-
able cause. In practice, therefore, some reports blended both
detailed factual findings with opinion and probable cause deter-
minations. The NTSB clarified by regulation in 1975 that there
is to be a distinction between the factual reports and the acci-
dent report with probable cause findings prepared by the
Board. The NTSB further clarified the distinction in 1999 when
it made clear that the factual accident reports are freely admissi-
ble in civil trials, while accident reports prepared by the Board
See Curry v. Chevron, USA, 779 F.2d 272, 274 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that
courts put a 'judicial gloss on § 701(e) [referred to as the exclusionary rule],
while allowing factual portions of the report to be admitted"); In re Cleveland
Tankers, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 463, 464 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (citing Curry, 779 F.2d at
272).
100 49 U.S.C. § 581 (repealed).
10, 49 U.S.C. § 1154 (2001) (collectively "The Act"). The language was also
temporarily at 49 U.S.C.A. § 1441(e) and 49 U.S.C.A. § 1903(c). Sioux City, 780 F.
Supp. at 1208.




are not.10 4 The practitioner is cautioned when citing to cases
that pre-date both the 1975 and the 1999 regulation clarifica-
tions because those cases were decided in a circumstance where
the distinction between a factual and a Board report was not
clearly delineated by regulation. Accordingly, courts often
found ways to interpret the regulations in such a way as to make
admissible critical facts set forth in Board reports, as well as
those found in Board accident reports.
1. Majority rule
Courts recognize that NTSB reports contain valuable evi-
dence. Most courts, therefore, refused to give full weight to the
federal exclusionary rule. In 1951, a D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals opinion began the assault against the exclusionary rule.
10 5
Universal Airline dealt not with the accident report directly, but
with the more general and troubling distinction between fact
and opinion. At issue was the admissibility of testimony by an
investigator: the court held that where the "investigator is the
sole source of evidence reasonably available to the parties, with
regard to the precise position and condition of the aircraft after
a disaster, we deem it to be incumbent upon the Civil Aeronau-
tics Authority to make his testimony available by deposition or in
person. '' 0° The court drew a distinction between the eviden-
tiary facts culled from an investigator's testimony and the "con-
clusions or opinions" of the investigator and declared that the
exclusionary rule applied only to the latter.107
A few months after Universal Airline, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals applied the fact-versus-conclusion distinction to the
reports themselves. In Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., the Second
Circuit acknowledged the section 701 (e) rule, which called for
exclusion of the entire report, but pointed out that the written
report at issue "consisted wholly of the investigator's personal
observations about the condition of the plane."108 The report
was simply a collection of facts and did not have opinions, con-
104 49 C.F.R. § 835.2.
105 See Universal Airline, Inc. v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993, 999-1000 (D.C.
Cir. 1951).
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1000. The court also stated that the reports raise a hearsay question.
Id. However, that hurdle was later largely eliminated by the public documents
exception of Fed. R. Evid. 803(8).
108 Lobel v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217, 220 (2d Cir. 1951).
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clusions, or findings.1"9 Unlike opinions or conclusions, the
facts in the NTSB report did not usurp the duty or function of
courts or juries and thus, the report was admissible."'
The majority rule sprung out of this reasoning. Most courts
have since held that, notwithstanding the express language of
section 701 (e), the factual portions of NTSB reports are
admissible. I I1
In practice, however, the majority rule is not itself uniform.
There are at least two different schools of thought on the appli-
cation of the majority rule: one calls for broad application, the
other, narrow. Both schools allow factual portions of the NTSB
report to be admitted into evidence. The distinction lies in what
is excluded.
Courts use the terms "opinion," "conclusion," "probable
cause," and "evaluation" loosely (sometimes referring to the en-
tire category as "opinion") and often uphold the total prohibi-
tion against the admissibility of the entire category.' 2 Other
courts reject this rule as too expansive and narrowly exclude
only opinion evidence that goes to the probable cause of the
accident. 11 3 The courts in the second category have criticized
the view that everything except "pure fact" should be excluded,
109 Id.
110 Id.
I See generally Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft Corp., 797 F.2d 845, 848 (10th Cir.
1986); Curry v. Chevron, USA, 779 F.2d 272, 274-75 (5th Cir. 1985); Keen v.
Detroit Diesel Allison, 569 F.2d 547, 549-52 (10th Cir. 1978) (discussing majority
rule in relation to testimony on opinion and probable cause of the accident);
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180, 195-97 (5th Cir. 1969); Berguido
v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 317 F.2d 628, 631-32 (3d Cir. 1962); Lobel, 192 F.2d at 220;
Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 893 P.2d 26, 33-36 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); In reAir
Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, Denver, Colorado, 720 F. Supp. 1493,
1495-96 (D. Colo. 1989); Starling v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 203 F.R.D. 468, 485-86
(D. Kan. 2001); Daniels v. Stuart, 675 A.2d 984, 986-88 (Me. 1996); In reAir Crash
at Charlotte, North Carolina, 982 F. Supp. 1071, 1075-78 (D. S.C. 1996); In re
Cleveland Tankers, 821 F. Supp. at 463-64; Kline v. Martin, 345 F. Supp. 31, 32
(E.D. Va. 1972).
112 "A more workable and better rule is entirely to exclude all evaluation, opin-
ion, and conclusion evidence." Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Frank, 227 F. Supp. 948, 949
(D. Conn. 1964). See also Berguido, 317 F.2d at 631 ("[T]he primary thrust of the
provision is to exclude CAB reports which express agency views as to the probable
cause of the accident. Of necessity, the opinion testimony of the CAB's investiga-
tors would also come within this rule.").
113 Mullan, 797 F.2d at 848; Keen, 569 F.2d at 549-51; Am. Airlines, 418 F.2d at
196; Kline, 345 F. Supp. at 32 ("Despite the statement in Berguido... that 'of
necessity, the opinion testimony of the CAB's investigators would also come
within this rule,' the statute does not go that far. Even if it does, however, it is
only the ultimate issue, the probable cause of the accident, that is prohibited.").
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finding that the test to distinguish opinion from factual evalua-
tion is too difficult to apply. "Because of the uncertainty which
[a rule that would exclude all evaluations, opinions and conclu-
sions] would introduce in sorting fact from opinion, it would be
better to exclude opinion testimony only when it embraces the
probable cause of the accident or the negligence of the
defendant." '114
Both judges and lawyers struggle with the practical applica-
tion of the fact-versus-opinion distinction. Along the continuum
between the two, there is no bright-line rule or conceptual de-
marcation between admissible factual findings and inadmissible
causal findings or opinions. The United States Supreme Court
stated, "It has frequently been remarked that the distinction be-
tween statements of fact and opinion is, at best, one of de-
gree."115 The Supreme Court also cited with approval this
language: "All statements in language are statements of opinion,
i.e., statements of mental processes or perceptions. So-called
'statements of fact' are only more specific statements of opin-
ion.""' 6 Thus, it is not surprising to find that courts provide lit-
te guidance on how to draw the necessary fine-line distinction
between fact and opinion.
Murphy v. Colorado Aviation, Inc. demonstrates the difficulty
that arises when distinguishing between fact and opinion for
purposes of determining admissibility of testimony.117 The testi-
mony at issue was that of a former NTSB employee who was the
supervisor and coordinator of the NTSB team that investigated
the accident."1 The court held that the former NTSB employee
could testify as to factual evidence, but not to his "own or the
Board's ultimate conclusions concerning the probable cause of
the accident or the negligence of the defendant."'1 9 However,
in attempting to separate facts from conclusions, the court al-
lowed the employee to testify as to everything that did not cause
114 Am. Airlines, 418 F.2d at 196.
115 Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 168 (1988).
116 Id. (citing W. KING & D. PILLINGER, OPINION EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS 4 (1942)
(footnote omitted) (quoted in 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVi-
DENCE 701 [01], p. 701-06 (1988)). The Court also cited with approval the lan-
guage, "There is no conceivable statement however specific, detailed, and
'factual,' that is not in some measure the product of inference and reflection as
well as observation and memory." Id. (citing E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
27 (3d ed. 1984)).
117 Murphy v. Colorado Aviation, Inc., 588 P.2d 877 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
118 Id. at 882.
119 Id.
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the accident and left only the pilot's negligence as the sole plau-
sible cause of the accident. 120 The court's ruling supports the
conclusion that an NTSB investigator may testify as to any opin-
ion other than his or her opinion as to the specific probable
cause of the accident. The Murphy court reasoned that an inves-
tigator may testify negatively as to what did not cause the acci-
dent, but may not testify positively as to what actually did cause
the accident. This case is an example of how a lawyer can make
the probable cause quite clear to a layperson without violating
the rule that excludes probable cause evidence.1 2 1
The Murphy reasoning has not been accepted by all courts,
however, and the Court of Appeals of Oregon, facing a similar
question, concluded that the testimony from an NTSB accident
investigator who testified that he noted no pilot error or mis-
operation of the aircraft was properly excluded because it called
for an opinion on the cause of the crash. 122
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also considered the diffi-
cult problem of distinguishing between fact and probable cause
findings in Keen v. Detroit Diesel Alison, where the plaintiff alleged
an engine defect caused the crash. 123 The court held that there
was no error in admitting testimony of an NTSB investigator
who said that the plane was functioning normally at high power
at the time of its crash.1 24 The court reasoned that this was
merely factual testimony, even though as between pilot negli-
gence and aircraft defect, it left only pilot negligence as the
probable cause of the accident.1 25
120 Id. The court stated, "His testimony, however, while leading to such conclu-
sion, did not state that this accident was caused by the negligence of the pilot."
Id. The employee was allowed to explain:
[N] avigational aids, the factual circumstances surrounding the acci-
dent, the difference between visual (VFR) and instrument flight rat-
ings (IFR), interpreted weather documents, indicated that weather
information had been transmitted to the pilot from the Roanoke
airport, stated that there was no evidence of any pre-impact mal-
function of the aircraft, opined that only an IFR pilot should fly in
clouds, that there was a safe alternate route for VFR pilots, and that
under the prevailing weather conditions in the area at the time of
the crash, only an IFR pilot could have been flying properly at the
altitude at which the crash occurred.
Id.
121 R. Atwood, Admissibility of National Transportation Safety Board Reports in Civil
Air Crash Litigation, 53J. AIR L. & Com. 469, 493-94 (1987).
122 Carlson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 646 P.2d 43, 49 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
123 Keen v. Detroit Diesel Alison, 569 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1978).




On the other hand, another court, dealing with the inference
that can be drawn from evidence of what did not cause the acci-
dent, excluded a page of a factual report because the NTSB in-
vestigation put the word "none" next to the entry "Part Failure/
Malfunction." 126 The court reasoned that this comment was, in
form, more like opinion testimony, even though it was only evi-
dence about what did not cause the failure. Plainly, counsel's
success in eliciting testimony about what did not cause the acci-
dent will be unpredictable and largely dependent on the
proclivities of the particular trial court.
Courts have also dealt with the related question of whether
expert opinions based in part on an NTSB report should be
fully admissible. The Tenth Circuit, in Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft
Corp., dealt with the issue in circumstances where one party ar-
gued that the opposing expert relied too heavily on the NTSB
report when forming his opinion.1 27 The evidence revealed that,
the expert based his opinion, in part, on the report.128 The
court rejected the inference that because the conclusions of the
expert were similar to the conclusions of the NTSB, the expert
impermissibly relied too heavily on the report.1 29
2. Minority rule
The fact-versus-opinion distinction has proven difficult to ap-
ply, and therefore, some courts have entirely rejected any at-
tempt to invoke the distinction. A small minority of courts have
refused to admit any part of an NTSB report, fact or opinion, in
light of the clear language of the former section 701 (e) (current
49 U.S.C. § 1154). Over the last decade, the Northern District
of Illinois has unequivocally held several times that no part of an
NTSB report is admissible in civil trials.1 30 "The unequivocal
language of 1441(e) and 1903(c) appears to leave no room for
creative interpretation. The language, on its face, states an abso-
126 See Jet Air, Inc. v. Epps Air Serv., Inc., 392 S.E.2d 245, 248-49 (Ga. Ct. App.
1990).
127 Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft Corp., 797 F.2d 845 (10th Cir. 1986).
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 In reAir Crash Near Roselawn, Indiana, No. 95 C 4593, MDL 1070, 1997 WL
572896, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 1997); Van Houten-Maynard v. ANR Pipeline
Co., No. 89 C 0377, 1995 WL 317072, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 1995); Van Houten-
Maynard v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. 89 C 0377, 1995 WL 311367, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
May 19, 1995); Trans States Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc., No. 92-C-
1658, 1995 WL 59235, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 1995); In reAir Crash Disaster at
Sioux City, Iowa, 780 F. Supp. 1207, 1208-12 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
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lute bar to the use of NTSB reports in the present action."11
The Ninth Circuit also held that no part of an NTSB report
would be admissible.
132
3. Chiron and a New NTSB Regulation
In 1999, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals established a third
interpretation of the section 1154 exclusionary rule by strictly
construing the 1999 revision to 49 C.F.R. § 835.2.133 This regula-
tion drew a new line and redefined the NTSB report as consist-
ing of two parts.' The revision to section 835.2 provided that
there were "Board accident reports" and "factual accident re-
ports."' 11 5 The regulation further stated "no part of a Board acci-
dent report may be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or
action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in
such reports. "136 Although the regulation's language before
1999 recognized that there was a separate factual accident re-
port, it gave no guidance as to the admissibility of the factual
reports, except by implication.
The 1999 revision to section 835.2 adds that the factual acci-
dent report is freely admissible. The new language now states:
"Factual accident report means the report containing the results
of the investigator's investigation of the accident. The Board
does not object to, and there is no statutory bar to, admission in
litigation of factual accident reports."1 37
The first court to adopt the new distinction was the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Chiron Corp. v. NTSB. 13' The court
stated that in light of the new language in section 835.2, parties
131 Sioux City, 780 F. Supp. at 1208-09.
132 Gibson v. NTSB, 118 F.3d 1312,1314 (9th Cir. 1997); Protectus Alpha Navi-
gation Co. v. North Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1379, 1384-85 (9th Cir.
1985); Benna v. Reeder Flying Serv., Inc., 578 F.2d 269, 271 (9th Cir. 1978); see
also Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. at 1496 (stating that "[h]ad these cases
been tried in Idaho, the Ninth Circuit rule would be strong precedent control-
ling the presentation of evidence. The N'TSB report would have been inadmissi-
ble in its entirety under Protectus."). But see Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 893
P.2d 26, 34 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that Stapleton was an incorrect interpre-
tation of Protectus, and that even though the court in Protectus upheld the exclu-
sion of the entire report, it only intended to make inadmissible the probable
cause and conclusions while allowing factual findings to be admitted).
133 See 49 C.F.R. § 835.2 (2002).
134 Id.
135 Id. This part of the regulation's language has remained largely unchanged.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Chiron Corp. v. NTSB, 198 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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(and victims) "have access to necessary factual information.
Therefore, courts no longer need to employ an 'exception' to
the statute to protect parties in litigation."'1 39 The court further
explained that before the revision, when section 1154 and part
835.2 were "interpreted broadly to include investigators' re-
ports, there may have been a public policy justification for ad-
mitting factual information. However, once the statute was
interpreted more narrowly, no justification remained for any ex-
ception to § 1154(b)."' a
Thus, the Chiron rule would admit into evidence any part of
the factual accident report and would strictly prohibit admissi-
bility of the entire Board accident report (even in circumstances
where all but a few pages of the Board accident report consist of
factual summary). The chairman of each group prepares the
factual reports in major air crashes. 141 These reports lack the
full authority of the NTSB and are prepared before the Board
formalizes its probable cause findings. As the D.C. Circuit
pointed out, in light of unfettered access to the factual findings,
there is no longer a public policy reason to invade the protec-
tions of the Board accident report. Since Chiron, other courts
and treatises have restated the holding or have similarly inter-
preted 49 C.F.R. § 835.2.142 However, it is not clear whether the
139 Id. at 941.
140 Id.
14' 49 C.F.R. § 835.2.
142 Hickson Corp. v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 903, 908-09
(E.D. Tenn. 2002) (stating that a Board accident report is not admissible, but a
factual accident report was admissible, and holding that it may have been error
for the court to admit portions of the Board accident report-although, because
it was invited error, it was not reversible); Coffey v. Cherokee Aviation, Inc., No.
E1999-01037-COA-R3-C, 2000 WL 991657, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 19, 2000)
(citing 49 C.F.R. § 835.2 and reasoning that the Board accident report is not
admissible, but a factual accident report is admissible); MICHAEL H. GRAHAM,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.8 n.28 (5th ed. Supp. 2003); William R.
Dorsey, III, Marine Casualty Investigations by the United States Coast Guard and the
National Transportation Safety Board, 75 TUL. L. REv. 1387, 1414-15 (2001);Jason A.
Lyons, et al., Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit: Administrative Law, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 477, 480 (2001).
Compare, however, Starling v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 203 F.R.D. 468, 485 (D. Kan.
2001), which also considered the 1999 revisions to 49 C.F.R. § 835.2. In Starling,
plaintiff sought to exclude twenty-five documents that the parties had received
from the NTSB, which included transcript testimony and exhibits used by the
NTSB, but which were not incorporated into the Board accident report. Id. The
court cited the majority rule cases and the new section 835.2 language to hold
that the "[p]laintiff has not cited any authority to support the proposition that
anything beyond the actual written NTSB report might be barred from being
used as evidence in court." Id. However, the court remained reluctant to an-
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reasoning in Chiron will evolve into the new standard. Arguably,
the Chiron standard is conceptually more efficient and is sup-
ported by the plain language of 49 C.F.R. § 835.2. It represents
a compromise that allows a trier of fact to use the high quality
information gathered by the NTSB without the confusion and
pitfalls related to trying to distinguish between opinion or con-
clusion and fact. The Chiron rule further allows courts to gain
the benefit of the majority rule without resorting to judicial
gloss.
The Chiron rule will be readily applied in practice in those
circumstances where the factual report contains only facts, and
no opinions or conclusions. In light of the precedential
strength of the majority rule, litigants may challenge the admis-
sibility of statements made in the factual reports if the report
contains conclusory or opinion statements. Admitting such
opinion statements found in the factual report would, under the
Chiron rule, lead to an invasion of the province of the trier of
fact, and could then lead to a return to the same fact-versus-
opinion confusion that exists when applying the current major-
ity rule. On the other hand, any opinion statements contained
in a factual report would be authored only by an investigator
and arguably would lack the authority and overwhelming influ-
ence of the full Board.
B. DEPOSITION AND TESTIMONY AS A MEANS TO INTRODUCE
PORTIONS OF THE NTSB REPORT
In jurisdictions or courts that tend to limit the admissibility of
NTSB reports, testimony of NTSB investigators, either by written
interrogatory or by deposition, is a more universally accepted
means to introduce the factual findings of the NTSB investiga-
tion. The minority rule jurisdiction of the Northern District of
Illinois held that the NTSB maintains "a clear and unequivocal
distinction between evidentiary use of NTSB reports and investi-
gator testimony." '143 Federal regulations place limitations on the
nounce or to apply a new standard, holding that "the only parts of the NTSB
report that are off limits are those that contain agency conclusions on the proba-
ble cause of an accident." Id. In short, the Starling court applied the old majority
rule.
143 In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 780 F. Supp. 1207, 1209 (N.D.
Ill. 1991). The court, applying the minority rule, pointed out that it interpreted
the regulations as creating an absolute bar to evidentiary use of the NTSB report,




testimony of NTSB investigators. These limitations are similar
to the limitations on admissibility of NTSB reports under the
majority rule. In fact, the majority rule regarding the admissibil-
ity of the factual portions of NTSB reports may have sprung
from the more lenient doctrine then applicable to NTSB investi-
gator testimony.'44
In many early opinions, courts considering the admissibility of
NTSB reports looked to the regulations and case law related to
the admissibility of NTSB investigator testimony and vice
versa.' 45 Some minority rule decisions, in their strict reading of
the statutes, hold that the entire Board report can be excluded
because Congress intended NTSB investigator testimony, not
NTSB reports, to act as the means to introduce the factual re-
sults of investigations in civil litigations.146 "Congress plainly
chose to serve its purpose of preventing NTSB data from
'usurp [ing] the function of the jury' by absolutely barring ad-
mission of NTSB reports, while permitting limited testimony
from NTSB employees."'47 Therefore, even in the minority rule
jurisdictions that uphold a complete bar to any part of the NTSB
report, the excluded factual information can be entered into ev-
idence by trial or deposition testimony of an NTSB investigator.
The NTSB regulation allows for the admissibility of an NTSB
employee's factual testimony. 4 8 NTSB employees may testify "as
to the factual information they obtained during the course of an
investigation, including factual evaluations embodied in their
factual accident report." 149 The purpose of this regulation is to
ensure that "the time of Board employees is used only for offi-
cial purposes, to avoid embroiling the Board in controversial is-
sues that are not related to its duties, to avoid spending public
-4 It could be fairly said that the majority rule sprung out of LobeL However,
the Second Circuit was borrowing from a D.C. Circuit case that allowed factual,
but not conclusion or opinion, testimony. See Universal Airline, Inc. v. E. Air
Lines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993, 999-1000 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
145 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180, 196 (5th Cir. 1969) (up-
holding admissibility of factual portions on NTSB report in light of precedent
concerning admissibility of NTSB investigator factual testimony); Berguido v. E.
Air Lines, Inc., 317 F.2d 628, 631-32 (3d Cir. 1962) (upholding admissibility of
factual testimony by referencing congressional intent in adopting the exclusion
statute for NTSB reports); Kline v. Martin, 345 F. Supp. 31, 32 (E.D. Va. 1972)
(admitting NTSB investigator factual testimony in light of the NTSB reports ex-
clusion statute and NTSB report precedent).
146 Sioux City, 780 F. Supp. at 1210.
147 Id. (citing Universal Airline, 188 F.2d at 1000).
148 49 C.F.R. § 835.3(a)-(b) (2002).
149 Id.
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funds for non-Board purposes, to preserve the impartiality of
the Board, and to prohibit the discovery of opinion
testimony." 15
0
A Board employee may testify by deposition or written inter-
rogatories, but not by live court testimony.'5 1 NTSB employee
testimony is only allowed if the employee has unique, firsthand
information. 5 2 Furthermore, while "Board employees may tes-
tify about the firsthand information they obtained during an in-
vestigation that is not reasonably available elsewhere,... [they]
are not authorized to testify regarding other employee's reports,
or other types of Board documents."' '5 Therefore, the fact that
information is contained in a factual accident report does not
necessarily make it the proper subject of deposition testimony.
Counsel will likely be restricted from pursuing a line of ques-
tioning related to certain portions of the factual accident report
that contain information that is not of the deponent's firsthand
knowledge and that relates to any prohibited conclusions or
information. 15 4
NTSB employee testimony must receive advance approval by
the General Counsel. 15  While testifying, an NTSB employee
may bring and use copies of the factual accident report that he
or she prepared to refresh his or her recollection.156 However,
no part of the Board's accident report may be used for any pur-
pose during a Board employee's testimony.' 57
Board employees may only be deposed once, the deposition
must take place at the Board's office where the employee is as-
signed, and must occur at a time "arranged with the employee
reasonably fixed to avoid substantial interference with the per-
formance of his duties. "158 Typically, the General Counsel of
the NTSB will not approve a deposition for a civil trial until the
combined factual accident report is issued. However, if it is a
major accident investigation, the General Counsel may approve
150 49 C.F.R. § 835.1 (2002).
151 In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 780 F. Supp. 1207, 1209 (N.D.
Ill. 1991) ("The current regulations further prohibit investigators from testifying
in court, and instead limit NTSB employee testimony to deposition form."); 49
C.F.R. § 835.5(a).
152 Id.
153 49 C.F.R. § 835.3(c) (2002).
154 49 C.F.R. § 835.3(e) (2002).
155 49 C.F.R. § 835.3(f) (2002).
156 49 C.F.R. § 835.4(a) (2002).
157 49 C.F.R. § 835.4(b) (2002).
158 49 C.F.R. § 835.5(b) (2002).
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the deposition once the groups complete their factual re-
ports."' Any Board employee who receives a subpoena will not
be given permission to give a deposition until the subpoena has
been withdrawn.1 60
Former NTSB employees may testify at a trial and do not need
Board approval before testifying. 61 However, the former em-
ployee is not permitted to testify about probable cause or Board
conclusions. 1 6 2 Notwithstanding these prohibitions, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals and the California Court of Appeals
have held that a former employee of the NTSB that was not ac-
tively involved in the investigation could testify as to his personal
opinion of the probable cause of the accident, because it was not
the NTSB's conclusion as to probable cause. 16 3 The regulations
only ban testimony as to the NTSB's probable cause conclu-
sions.164 In Lofileidir, the court reasoned that the employee's
opinions were derived after he left the NTSB and differed with
the NTSB's conclusions and therefore, did not reflect the
NTSB's views.' 65
VIII. OTHER LIMITATIONS ON DISCLOSURE
OF INFORMATION
A. COCKPIT OR SURFACE VEHICLE RECORDINGS
AND TRANSCRIPTS
Respect for the dignity and privacy of pilots, as well as con-
cerns regarding the "safety" function of recording devices, has
lead to the development of procedures that limit the public dis-
closure of cockpit voice recorders. In light of such concerns,
and tempered by the obvious need for such information to aid
159 49 C.F.R. § 835.6(b) (2002).
M6 49 C.F.R. § 835.9(a) (2002).
161 49 C.F.R. § 835.7 (2002).
162 Id.
163 Campbell v. Keystone Aerial Surveys, Inc., 138 F.3d 996, 1002 (5th Cir.
1998); Loftleidir Icelandic Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 204 Cal.
Rptr. 358, 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
164 Loftleidir, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 363 (citing 49 C.F.R. 835.7; 49 C.F.R. 835.3).
However, this is not a universal reading of the regulations. See Carlson v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 646 P.2d 43, 48 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) ("[49 U.S.C. § 1141(e)
(2001)] and 49 C.F.R. § 835.3 . . . have been interpreted by federal and state
courts, which have held that federal investigators may relate factual evidence and
give opinions so long as they do not testify to their own or to NTSB's 'ultimate conclu-
sions'concerning the cause of the accident or the negligence of the tortfeasor.")
(emphasis added).
165 Lofileidir, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
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investigations, Congress passed legislation that allows the Board
to release a "relevant" transcript, but not a recording unless
there is sufficient safety-related reasons to require public disclo-
sure. The statute states:
The Board may not disclose publicly any part of a cockpit voice
or video recorder or transcript of oral communications by and
between flight crew members and ground stations related to an
accident or incident investigated by the Board. However, the
Board shall make public any part of a transcript or any written
depiction of visual information the Board decides is relevant to
the accident or incident.
66
The public safety exception states: "This subsection does not
prevent the Board from referring at any time to cockpit voice or
video recorder information in making safety recommenda-
tions." 167 The same language is restated in the context of sur-
face vehicle recordings.
168
Cockpit voice recordings and full transcripts may not be dis-
covered unless the court, after an in camera review, decides: (1)
that the part of the transcript made public does not provide the
party with adequate information to provide for a fair trial; and
(2) discovery of other parts of the transcript is necessary to pro-
vide a fair trial. 169 Furthermore, there can only be discovery of
the transcript if the recording itself is not available.17 0 When the
court allows discovery of a transcript or recording, the court
must put the material under seal and issue a protective order
that limits the use of the material to that particular judicial pro-
ceeding, and prohibits dissemination of the material to any per-
son that does not need access to it for the judicial proceeding.17 1
The Board may make cockpit voice recordings and transcripts
available to the public in the form of a reference in a safety
recommendation. 172
B. FOREIGN INVESTIGATIONS
The Board will not release information that it has received
from foreign aircraft investigations unless the foreign country
has released the report or two years have passed since the
166 49 U.S.C. § 1114(c) (1) (2001).
167 49 U.S.C. § 1114(c) (2) (2001).
168 49 U.S.C. § 1114(d) (2001).
169 49 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (2001).
170 49 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (2) (B).
171 49 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (4).
172 49 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(5).
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accident, whichever comes first.173 The Board may also release
such information when the country doing the investigation
authorizes it to do so, or if the Board is making safety
recommendations. 174
C. INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
Legislation provides that the NTSB is not required to release
any information that is protected from disclosure under section
552 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).175 This in-
cludes: (1) information kept secret by Executive order in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy; (2) information
related solely to internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency; (3) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or let-
ters that would not be available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with the agency; (4) personnel, medical, and
other files whose disclosure would constitute a clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal property; and (5) law enforcement
records in certain circumstances. 176 Under some circumstances,
in particular in the context of a mishap involving military air-
craft, counsel must be cognizant of the APA limitations on the
release of information.
IX. CONCLUSION
The NTSB investigation process is largely controlled by legis-
lation and regulation. This paper touches on some of the criti-
cal statutes and regulations that affect the investigation, in
particular those that are pertinent to on-going or subsequent
litigation.
An understanding of the NTSB investigation process is crucial
to effective representation of clients in air crash litigation. With
a thorough understanding of the process and an appreciation
for the public policy that does not allow the litigation process to
intrude on the investigation process, counsel can take active
measures during the course of the investigation to develop the
case independently, to anticipate evidentiary hurdles, and to for-
mulate a strategy for securing the best evidence outside the
NTSB investigation process.
173 49 U.S.C. § 1114(f)(1) (A) (2001).
,74 49 U.S.C. § 1114(f)(1)(B); 49 U.S.C. § 1114(f)(2) (2001).
175 49 U.S.C. § 1114 (a)(1).
176 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2001).
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Once the investigation is complete, all attorneys involved in
subsequent litigation will have to deal with the question of ad-
missibility of the NTSB reports. The evolving rule seems to al-
low for admission of the entire factual report. Difficulty will
undoubtedly arise in those circumstances where the NTSB fac-
tual reports include some opinions or conclusions, or where the
Board accident report contains mostly facts, with a short state-
ment on probable cause.
